ZENTARA

Industries · Telecommunications

Everyone else's continuity plan assumes you are up.

Banks, ministries and hospitals all wrote resilience plans that quietly depend on your network staying available and your subscriber identity staying trustworthy. Both assumptions are now under active attack — one through the transport layer, the other through a dealer counter. Zentara works on the second as seriously as the first, because that is where the money actually moves.

19 Jul 2026
Biometric registration became binding
Permenkomdigi 7/2026 — the six-month transition has closed
NIK + KK
The identifiers being misused today
Komdigi: registration data used for fraud, spam and gambling
SIM swap
Where account takeover begins
The number is the second factor for every bank in the country
72 hrs
To notify a personal data breach
UU PDP — subscriber data at national scale

What we are defending

Where the network ends and the identity begins.

01

Registration and replacement

The SIM swap surface. Not a network vulnerability — a process one, spread across thousands of retail points with uneven training and a sales target.

02

Dealer and retail channel

Where fraud actually enters. Testing the core and ignoring the counter measures the half of the estate that was never the weak point.

03

Signalling and interconnect

SS7 and Diameter assume peer operators behave. Location disclosure and message interception through interconnect remain viable against operators who have not filtered.

04

OSS and BSS

Provisioning, billing and the customer service desk. A social engineer who reaches an agent with authority does not need a network exploit.

05

5G core and slicing

Service-based architecture moves the problem into APIs and shared infrastructure, where a slice boundary is a security boundary whether it was scoped as one or not.

06

Transport and physical estate

Subsea landings, backhaul, unmanned huts and towers. Physical access at a remote site is a network compromise nobody is watching.

Instrument · Obligation · Operational outcome

The registration rules changed. The fraud will move, not stop.

Permenkomdigi 7/2026 introduced biometric registration precisely because NIK and Family Card numbers were being abused, and it has been fully binding since 19 July 2026. The exposure did not close with it: the tens of millions of numbers registered under the old standard are still active, and replacement is the path back to them.

Permenkomdigi 7/2026

Komdigi

Requires

Customer registration for mobile services with facial-biometric verification. Enacted 19 January 2026, mandatory for new numbers from 1 July, fully binding since 19 July 2026.

We do

Assess the installed base rather than the new-registration path — every number issued before July sits behind the old standard, and replacement is where that legacy is reachable.

What the operator ends up with

Channel-wide identity assurance assessment

Perpres 82/2022

Pelindungan IIV

Requires

Vital information infrastructure protection under BSSN coordination, with an organisational cyber incident response team required of designated operators.

We do

CSIRT stand-up and exercise at the pace a carrier actually runs, plus the assessment establishing what within the estate is in scope.

What the operator ends up with

Operating CSIRT, scoped asset register

UU PDP

Republik Indonesia

Requires

Lawful processing and 72-hour breach notification, over subscriber holdings that rank among the largest personal data estates in the country.

We do

Governance across subscriber, network and retail data, and a notification runbook rehearsed against a realistic volume rather than a tabletop one.

What the operator ends up with

DPIA records, rehearsed runbook

PSE registration

Komdigi

Requires

Registration and associated obligations for electronic system providers, including the platforms and partners operating on your behalf.

We do

Partner and platform assessment, because obligations extend to services offered under your brand by somebody else's code.

What the operator ends up with

Partner assurance register

ISO 27001

Certifiable

Requires

Information security management system, routinely required in enterprise and government contracting.

We do

Implementation scoped to include network operations rather than only corporate IT, which is the common and unhelpful shortcut.

What the operator ends up with

Certifiable ISMS covering network operations

Identity · What it takes to become someone else

The number is the second factor for the whole economy.

Almost every bank, wallet and government service in Indonesia treats possession of a mobile number as proof of identity. That makes number takeover the highest-leverage fraud available, and it is why Permenkomdigi 7/2026 moved to biometrics. Registration is now the strong link. Replacement is not: a number issued in 2019 against a NIK and a Family Card number is still active, and the counter that reissues it is where an attacker will go. The ladder below is the honest question — at your weakest channel, on your busiest day, what does someone actually have to present to walk out with another person's number?

Subscriber identity assurance

  1. 1

    Knowledge

    NIK and Family Card number. Both widely circulated, neither secret.

  2. 2

    Document

    Physical identity document sighted at a counter, verified by eye, under a sales target.

  3. 3

    Multi-signal

    Document plus account history the real subscriber would know, checked systematically.

  4. 4

    Biometric

    Face match at registration and again at replacement, with liveness — not only at first sale.

  5. 5

    Continuous

    Biometric plus velocity, device and behavioural signals, correlated across every channel including dealers.

Highlighted: where the replacement-SIM flow has to sit given what the number now unlocks.

Framing derived from Permenkomdigi 7/2026 and observed SIM swap methodology

Sector threat model

  • SIM swap and unauthorised number porting — the fraud lands on a bank, the failure happened at your counter
  • The installed base — numbers registered years ago against a NIK and a Family Card number, still active and still reachable through replacement
  • Signalling and interconnect abuse across SS7 and Diameter, exploiting trust between operators
  • Dealer and retail channel compromise, where an incentive structure quietly rewards volume over verification
  • Subscriber databases at national scale — the largest personal data holdings outside government
  • Infrastructure-scale disruption, where your outage becomes everybody else's incident

What this sector answers to

The regulatory landscape for telecommunications. Our own accreditations are listed on certifications.

Permenkomdigi 7/2026Perpres 82/2022 — IIVUU PDPPSE registrationISO 27001

Track record

Managed SOC and EDR operations for national carriers and fiber operators.

Where telecommunications meets banking

The fraud is one crime committed against two institutions.

A SIM swap is a telco process failure and a banking loss, investigated by two organisations who each see half of it. Neither has the whole picture, and the attacker relies on exactly that. Zentara works on both sides of this line — the same team that assesses a bank's authentication assesses the channel that issues its second factor.

  • Joint threat modelling across the number lifecycle and the authentication flow that depends on it.
  • Shared indicators — porting velocity, replacement patterns and device change signals that mean more to a bank than to a carrier, and vice versa.
  • Incident practice run with both parties present, because the first live one will involve both anyway.
  • Findings written so a bank's fraud team and a carrier's network team can act on the same document.

Before you have to justify us internally

Bringing in a security vendor is itself a risk you have to evidence.

So here is the answer to the questions your risk committee will ask, before they ask them.

We test the counter, not only the core

Assessment covers the retail and dealer channel as a first-class attack surface, because that is where number takeover begins and it is routinely out of scope elsewhere.

We do not build or operate interception capability

Lawful intercept infrastructure is not something we supply, configure or advise on. Our work is defensive, and that boundary is written into scope.

No subscriber data required to do the work

Assessments are designed around synthetic and consented test identities. We do not ask for production subscriber records and will not accept them.

Nothing live on signalling without change control

Interconnect and signalling testing runs through your change process, in your window, with rollback agreed before anything is sent.

Findings go to fraud and to network, together

SIM swap sits between two teams that report separately. A report that only one of them reads is a report that changes nothing.

Your operations team keeps the capability

Detection content, playbooks and runbooks are handed over and taught. A carrier the size of yours should not depend on us to run its own floor.

VAPT & Offensive Security

Penetration testing for Telecommunications

33 services in the catalog apply to Telecommunications — from point-in-time pentests to red team and continuous validation.

Explore all 33
Penetration Test

External Network Penetration Test

Black-box test of internet-facing assets, perimeter exposure, and exploitable services.

Penetration Test

Internal Network Penetration Test

Assumed-breach lateral movement, AD abuse, sensitive data discovery from inside.

Penetration Test

Active Directory / Entra ID Security Assessment

Kerberoasting, AS-REP, ACL abuse, BloodHound paths, hybrid identity review.

Assessment

Firewall, Router & Switch Configuration Review

Rule base hygiene, ACL drift, hardening against CIS Benchmarks.

Penetration Test

VPN Security Assessment

IKE/IPsec, SSL VPN, split tunneling, ZTNA migration readiness.

Assessment

Email & DNS Security Review

SPF/DKIM/DMARC, MTA-STS, DNSSEC, BIMI, phishing surface.

Penetration Test

Web Application Penetration Test

OWASP Top 10, business logic, authenticated/unauthenticated flows.

Assessment

Secure Code Review (Manual + SAST)

Manual review of critical flows + SAST tooling for OWASP/CWE coverage.

Securing telecommunications?

Start with a scored maturity baseline or go straight to a specialist conversation.